Many patients experience aspects of treatment and care as dehumanizing because the body is considered separate from the self and its life context. An attempt to transcend viewing persons in dualistic terms is posed by phenomenologists who focus not on “the body” as such but on what it means to be “embodied.” In this paper, we review the relevance of the phenomenology of the body for health care and report the results of comparing Sally Gadow’s phenomenological insights about body-self unity (...) with a qualitative analysis of patients’ accounts of satisfaction with the outcome of hand surgery. We illustrate the ways in which our findings were and were not congruent with Gadow’s conceptualization of embodiment and highlight aspects that are ambiguous. We conclude that the body-self dialectical relationship should be recast as a body-self-society trialectic and discuss the implications of this new conceptualization for clinical practices. (shrink)

That the story of Cupid and Psyche in Apuleius' Metamorphoses is a version of a common world-wide folk-tale has long been recognized. Scholarly debate has concentrated on the conclusions to be drawn from this with regard to the significance of the story—mythological, religious, allegorical, and so on. With the additional information provided by Swahn's comprehensive monograph on the subject an attempt can now be made to study some of the aspects of literary technique involved in the adaptation of the folk-tale. (...) In what follows I have tried to avoid making any assumptions about a possible literary source of Apuleius' tale. I am concerned with the ways in which the literary version which we possess modifies the folk material, and not with the author of this modification. (shrink)

The setting of this epigram is the komos sequence explored by Copley in his important book. The speaker is about to set forth in the dark, since he requires some means of lighting his way. A companion offers him a torch. It is refused as unnecessary because of the flame of love which burns in his breast.

"Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could (...) succeed, (...) it would pre-empt any role in the diagnosis and treatment of sceptical paradoxes for the kind of notion of entitlement (rational, non-evidential warrant) I have proposed elsewhere [Wright 2004]. But my overarching contention will be that Dogmatism is, generally and locally, too problematic a stance to be helpful in that project. (shrink)

The confusion of categories in Spinoza's ethics, by E. Albee.--Hegel's criticism of Spinoza, by K. E. Gilbert.--Rationalism in Hume's philosophy, by G. H. Sabine.--Freedom as an ethical postulate: Kant, by R. A. Tsanoff.--Mill and Comte, by N. C. Barr.--The intellectualistic voluntarism of Alfred Fouillée, by A. T. Penney.--Hegelianism and the Vedanta, by E. L. Hinman.--Coherence as organization, by G. W. Cunningham.--Time and the logic of monistic idealism, by J. A. Leighton.--The datum, by W. B. Pillsbury.--The limits of the physical, by (...) G. A. de Laguna.--Is the dualism of mind and matter final? By H. W. Wright.--The revolt against dualism, by A. H. Jones. (shrink)

Disagreeing with many students of American philosophy who have interpreted Chauncey Wright as foreshadowing basic elements in the pragmatisms of Peirce, James and Dewey, Madden contends that the characteristic elements of Wright's thought are neither peculiar to pragmatism nor anticipations of its basic tenets. After an introductory biography of Wright's short, often lonely, tragic life, Madden presents a penetrating analysis of Wright's more important essays dealing with many currently debated problems in the philosophy of religion, (...) moral philosophy, philosophy of science and cosmology, epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. The case for Wright's "philosophical independence" seems to be based on Madden's neglect of important nuances within pragmatism itself.--B. G. R. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd Reviews 173 WITTGENSTEIN’S PRIMORDIAL WORK James Connelly Philosophy / Trent U. Peterborough, on, Canada k9j 7b8 [email protected] Michael Potter. Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford U. P., 2009. Pp. [xii], 310. isbn 978-0-19-921583-6. £37.00; us$70.00. April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd 174 Reviews Michael Potter’s (...) Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic is a painstakingly detailed scholarly study which blends philosophical insight with biographical and historical context to yield a deeper appreciation of the key themes informing Wittgenstein’s philosophical development over his initial period of residence at Cambridge in 1911–13. Notingasurprising gap in the literature on Wittgenstein’s philosophy (p. 3), Potter sets out to treat Wittgenstein’s 1913 “Notes on Logic” (which consists of a succinct summary of the conclusions reached over this initial period) as an independent and primordial philosophical work. While it has been common for serious scholars of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to “mine” (p. 1) his pre-Tractarian writings in search of “remarks to support their interpretations ” (p. 1) of that text, what sets Potter’s study of the “Notes” apart from previous attempts at exegesis is a methodological determination to approach the “Notes” as “if not quite … a terminus in Wittgenstein’s work then at least as worthy of study in their own right” (p. 1). An important advantage of this approach, according to Potter, is that it facilitates a clearer appreciation of Wittgenstein’s lasting insights “into the central themes of philosophical logic” (p. 262), many of which Wittgenstein himself had already grasped by 1913 and which survive subsequent rejection of some of the less plausible aspects of the Tractatus (such as logical atomism and the picture theory of propositions). By presenting these key insights as consequences of central, but only subsequently adopted, Tractarian doctrines such as the picture theory, however, traditional Wittgenstein scholarship has missed an opportunity, uniquely important in the case of his philosophy (p. 1), to elucidate them against the background of the actual historical landscape of problems, strategies, motivations, and inXuences, within the context in which they were originally formulated. According to Potter, then, looking at the “Notes” as a Wnished work in its own right, as opposed to a mere collection of preparatory notes, will help us to understand better both the more thorough reasoning Wittgenstein worked through in developing these various insights (subsequently either suppressed or highly compressed in the Wnal draft of the Tractatus itselfy), and just what further logical work that subsequently added elements, such as the picture theory, were supposed to contribute. Likewise, such an approach will help us to understand better the relevant inXuences upon Wittgenstein’s philosophical development, such as those, obviously and respectively, of Frege and Russell. Integral to distilling these various insights and inXuences from the “Notes”, according to Potter, is the process of “disentangling” (p. 3) various extant versions of the text from one another, the distinct versions themselves arising from the “rather complicated circumstances” (p. 3) in which the “Notesz” were composed. Following upon a lengthy explication of both the content and philosophical context of the “Notes”, Potter therefore attempts to “reconstruct the circumstances of composition of Wittgenstein’s Wrst surviving philosophical work” (p. 263). This is achieved by engaging in some “historical detective work” April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd Reviews 175 1 Reprinted in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. G.yH. von Wright and G.yE.yM. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961) pp. 93–107. The second edition (1979) has the so-called “Russell” version of the “Notes on Logic”, which Potter prints in a diTerent arrangement. (p. 3), aimed at identifying and clarifying various crucial aspects of the “Notes”z’ historical and biographical context. Along with an Appendix B containing two diTerent versions of the “Notes” themselves (the “Cambridge” and “Birmingham... (shrink)

Wittgenstein said of Kierkegaard that he was the “single most profound philosopher of the 19th century”; but what accounts for Wittgenstein’s estimation of Kierkegaard’s work? I argue that Kierkegaard, who was a student of ancient philosophy, synthesized Socratic and Aristotelian concepts into a conception of philosophical inquiry that provided the basis for a Socratic-style engagement with what Kierkegaard calls “the present age”. This allows Kierkegaard to engage Socratically with the present age’s assumptions, but with a kind of categorial sophistication that (...) goes beyond traditional Socratic inquiry. This Kierkegaardian model, I argue, provides the template for what Wittgenstein comes to call “philosophical foundations of X”, where X is some non-philosophical enterprise, such as psychology or mathematics. But didn’t Wittgenstein’s later work constitute a fundamental break with the philosophical tradition altogether? As G. H. von Wright famously remarks, “the author of Philosophical Investigations has no ancestors in philosophy”. In fact, I argue that if a reasonable adjustment is made in the understanding of Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation, then the Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation can be seen to have more in common with certain Socratic and Aristotelian paradigms in ancient philosophy than we might otherwise assume. At that point, we can appreciate how the work of Søren Kierkegaard represents a significant conceptual and historical transitional link between these two periods. According to Kierkegaard, it is a central Socratic idea that anyone, no matter who they are, always already operates with some philosophical understanding of the things with which they are especially occupied in life. And scientists are no exception to this rule. In fact, scientists can be expected to operate with some formal-causal and ontological-categorial understanding of their subject, as well as an understanding of how the basic domains and topics that preoccupy them fit into the larger scheme of things: however, in light of the division of labor, scientists will not necessarily be aware of the extent to which they are already committed to a distinctively philosophical understanding of things. Making this philosophical understanding explicit and scrutinizing it may in turn have an impact on the ways in which scientists go on to frame their scientific research. I suggest that in light of the above genealogy of Wittgenstein’s concept of “philosophical foundations of X”, Wittgenstein can be regarded as a descendant of this Socratic tradition of philosophy, in which philosophy is occasioned by a reflection on the philosophical foundations of non-philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Perhaps the greatest determinant of individual and societal welfare is who raises children and with what degree of discretion. Philosophers have endeavored in myriad ways to provide normative justification for ascribing a right to be a legal parent and to possess particular legal powers as a parent. This Article shows why they fail and offers an alternative theoretical framework for delimiting parental rights. The prevailing tendency in philosophical writing on the topic is to begin with observations and intuitions specific to (...) parent-child relationships. Against that tendency, this Article demonstrates the need to begin with principles at a high level of generality, covering a broad range of human relationships. This yields a much more limited moral right in connection with parenthood than do accounts that fail to generalize. (shrink)

Stuart Glennan, and the team of Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver have recently provided two accounts of the concept of a mechanism. The main difference between these two versions rests on how the behavior of the parts of the mechanism is conceptualized. Glennan considers mechanisms to be an interaction of parts, where the interaction between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. Machamer, Darden, and Craver criticize traditional conceptualizations of mechanisms which are based solely on parts (...) interacting and introduce a new conceptactivity. This essay is an attempt at carving out a relationship between these two philosophical interpretations of a mechanism. I will claim that, rather than being in conflict, Glennan's concept of interaction and Machamer, Darden, and Craver's notion of activity actually complement one another, each emphasizing a missing element of the other. (shrink)

Kuhn closed the Introduction to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions with what was clearly intended as a rhetorical question: How could history of science fail to be a source of phenomena to which theories about knowledge may legitimately be asked to apply? (Kuhn 1970, 9) This paper argues that there is a more fruitful way of conceiving the relationship between a historical and philosophical study of science, which is dubbed the 'phylogenetic' approach. I sketch an example of this approach, and (...) take a first pass at an abstract characterization of the method. (shrink)

This paper develops an order-theoretic generalization of Blok and Pigozziʼs notion of an algebraizable logic. Unavoidably, the ordered model class of a logic, when it exists, is not unique. For uniqueness, the definition must be relativized, either syntactically or semantically. In sentential systems, for instance, the order algebraization process may be required to respect a given but arbitrary polarity on the signature. With every deductive filter of an algebra of the pertinent type, the polarity associates a reflexive and transitive relation (...) called a Leibniz order, analogous to the Leibniz congruence of abstract algebraic logic . Some core results of AAL are extended here to sentential systems with a polarity. In particular, such a system is order algebraizable if the Leibniz order operator has the following four independent properties: it is injective, it is isotonic, it commutes with the inverse image operator of any algebraic homomorphism, and it produces anti-symmetric orders when applied to filters that define reduced matrix models. Conversely, if a sentential system is order algebraizable in some way, then the order algebraization process naturally induces a polarity for which the Leibniz order operator has properties –. (shrink)

This essay outlines one aspect of a larger collaboration with John Beatty and Alan Love.2 The project’s focus is philosophical, but for reasons that will become clear momentarily, the method of approach is historical. All three of us share the conviction that philosophical issues concerning the foundations of the sciences are often illuminated by investigating their history. It is my hope that this paper both provides support for that thesis, and illustrates it. The focal philosophical issue can be stated in (...) the form of a puzzle about contemporary discussions of the conceptual foundations of evolutionary theory. The role of the concepts of “chance” and “randomness” in that theory is a significant part of .. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough humans experience orgasms with a degree of statistical regularity, they remain among the most enigmatic of sexual responses; difficult to define and even more difficult to study empirically. The question of whether animals experience orgasms is hampered by similar lack of definition and the additional necessity of making inferences from behavioral responses.MethodHere we define three behavioral criteria, based on dimensions of the subjective experience of human orgasms described by Mah and Binik, to infer orgasm-like responses in other species: 1) (...) physiological criteria that include pelvic floor and anal muscle contractions that stimulate seminal emission and/or ejaculation in the male, or that stimulate uterine and cervical contractions in the female; 2) short-term behavioral changes that reflect immediate awareness of a pleasurable hedonic reward state during copulation; and 3) long-term behavioral changes that depend on the reward state induced by the OLR, including sexual sat... (shrink)

T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) was not only an active protagonist in the religious and scientific upheaval that followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution but also a harbinger of the sociobiological debates about the implications of evolution that are now going on. His seminal lecture Evolution and Ethics, reprinted here with its introductory Prolegomena, argues that the human psyche is at war with itself, that humans are alienated in a cosmos that has no special reference to their needs, and (...) that moral societies are of necessity in conflict with the natural conditions of their existence. Seen in the light of current understanding of the mechanisms of evolution, these claims remain as controversial today as they were when Huxley proposed them. In this volume George Williams, one of the best-known evolutionary biologists of our time, asserts that recent biological ideas and data justify a more extreme condemnation of the "cosmic process" than Huxley advocated and more extreme denial that the forces that got us here are capable of maintaining a viable world. James Paradis, an expert in Victorian studies, has written an introduction that sets the celebrated lecture in the context of cultural history, revealing it to be an impressive synthesis of Victorian thinking, as well as a challenge to eighteenth-century assumptions about the harmony of of nature. With Huxley's lecture as a focal point, the three parts of this book unite philosophy and science in a shared quest that recalls their common origins as systems of knowledge. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

There is a tension at the heart of Aristotle's understanding of organic activities, created by his appeals to the productive activities of craftsmen and his use of normative language to characterize the goals of such activities. In this paper I discuss two ways of interpreting Aristotle's teleology aimed at resolving this tension, and discuss a closely analogous tension at the heart of a number of contemporary defenses of teleological reasoning in biology.

In another tumultuous term of the United States Supreme Court in 2022-2023 a series of critical cases implicate instant and forthcoming changes in multiple fronts that collectively shift the national public health law and policy environment.

Before military action, and even before mobilization, the decision on whether to go to war is debated by politicians, pundits, and the public. As they address the right or wrong of such action, it is also a time when, in the language of the just war tradition, the wise would deeply investigate their true claim to jus ad bellum (“the right of war”). Wars have negative consequences, not the least impinging on human life, and offer infrequent and uncertain benefits, yet (...) war is part of the human condition. James G. Murphy’s insightful analysis of the jus ad bellum criteria—competent authority, just cause, right intention, probability of success, last resort, and proportionality—is grounded in a variety of contemporary examples from World War I through Vietnam, the "soccer war" between Honduras and El Salvador, Afghanistan, and the Middle East conflict. Murphy argues persuasively that understanding jus ad bellum requires a primary focus on the international common good and the good of peace. Only secondarily should the argument about going to war hinge on the right of self-defense; in fact, pursuing the common good requires political action, given that peace is not simply the absence of violence. He moves on to demonstrate the interconnectedness of the jus ad bellum criteria, contending that some criteria depend logically on others—and that competent authority, not just cause, is ultimately the most significant criterion in an analysis of going to war. This timely study will be of special interest to scholars and students in ethics, war and peace, and international affairs. (shrink)

It is often claimed that one of Darwin''s chief accomplishments was to provide biology with a non-teleological explanation of adaptation. A number of Darwin''s closest associates, however, and Darwin himself, did not see it that way. In order to assess whether Darwin''s version of evolutionary theory does or does not employ teleological explanation, two of his botanical studies are examined. The result of this examination is that Darwin sees selection explanations of adaptations as teleological explanations. The confusion in the nineteenth (...) century about Darwin''s attitude to teleology is argued to be a result of Darwin''s teleological explanations not conforming to either of the dominant philosophical justifications of teleology at that time. Darwin''s explanatory practices conform well, however, to recent defenses of the teleological character of selection explanations. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for a simple version of Divine Command Morality, namely that an act’s being morally right consists in its being in accord with God’s will, and an act’s being morally wrong consists in its being contrary to God’s will. In so arguing, we contend that this simple version of Divine Command Morality is not subject to the Euthyphro dilemma, either as Plato or as contemporary critics have ordinarily proposed it. Nor, we maintain, is our position incompatible (...) with the most adequate formulation of natural law ethics. Finally we explain why Euthyphro could not have made a better case for his own position. (shrink)

This paper discusses six formalization techniques, of varying strengths, for extending a formal system based on traditional mathematical logic. The purpose of these formalization techniques is to simulate the introduction of new syntactic constructs, along with associated semantics for them. We show that certain techniques (among the six) subsume others. To illustrate sharpness, we also consider a selection of constructs and show which techniques can and cannot be used to introduce them. The six studied techniques were selected on the basis (...) of actual practice in logic and computing. They do not form an exhaustive list. (shrink)

Whatever its merits and difficulties, the concept of logic embedded in much of the "new philosophy" of the early modern period was then understood to supplant contemporary views of formal logic. The notion of compiling a natural history of the understanding constituted the basis of this new concept of logic. The following paper attempts to trace this view of logic through some of the major and numerous minor texts of the period, centering on the development and influence of John Locke's (...) understanding of the analysis of the cognitive faculties as the discipline of logic. (shrink)

A necessary condition for having a revolution named after you is that you are an innovator in your field. I argue that if Charles Darwin meets this condition, it is as a philosopher and methodologist. In 1991, I made the case for Darwin's innovative use of "thought experiment" in the "Origin." Here I place this innovative practice in the context of Darwin's methodological commitments, trace its origins back into Darwin's notebooks, and pursue Darwin's suggestion that it owes its inspiration to (...) Charles Lyell. (shrink)

A central difficulty in the way of understanding Spinoza's metaphysical system is that of reconciling two apparently contradictory theories of the causation of finite modes found in his Ethics. The easiest way to present the problem is to place these two accounts side by side.A. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must forever exist, and must be infinite; that is to say, through that attribute they are eternal and infinite. A thing which has (...) been determined to any action was necessarily so determined by God. Together, these propositions entail that God is a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of any action, and that anything so determined is eternal and infinite. Compare these implications with the following.B. An individual thing or a thing which is finite and has determinate existence cannot exist nor be determined to action unless it be determined to existence and action by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this cause cannot exist nor be determined to action unless by another cause which is also finite and determined to existence and action, and so on, ad infinitum. (shrink)